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Abstract: Financial market had developed a special instrument to insure the buyers of bonds. This 
instrument is so called Credit Default Swap (CDS). The CDS price is a kind of insurance 
premium that the buyer of CDS pays to the seller of CDS in exchange for compensation of 
possible loss in operation. Paper analyses causality between CDS price and dynamics of 
bond yields and infl uence of macroeconomic factors on it in four selected countries during 
the last fi nancial crisis. Analysis results show that there is no important macroeconomic 
variable included in the analysis that preceded the CDS prices connected with German 
government bonds. Sellers of CDS were apparently aware of the systemic nature of the 
fi nancial crisis in the euro area. In the case of the United Kingdom, Russia and Slovenia 
we can observe the unemployment rate as the most important macroeconomic variable that 
preceded the CDS prices for government bonds.
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Introduction and CDS market
This article shows the operation of the CDS (Credit Default Swap) market, a new 
instrument on the fi nancial market. It increases the security of the investment in 
bonds while allowing speculation, since CDS can be traded like bonds. In the article 
we fi rst introduce the economic theory of the new fi nancial instrument CDS and 
its specifi c market, then we analyze the Granger causality connection between the 
dynamics of the CDS prices, the government’s bond yields and macroeconomic fun-
damentals of four countries included in our sample (the United Kingdom, Germany, 
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Russia and Slovenia). We fi nish the article with conclusions, an outline of the meth-
odology, literature and data sources.
In the 1990s there was a special instrument developed on the fi nancial markets to 
insure bond buyers ahead of eventual loss in their investment (Stulz, 2010). The In-
strument was named Credit Default Swap (CDS) 1. The CDS is a contract according to 
which the seller of the CDS insures the buyer of the CDS (that is, in principle, also the 
buyer of bonds) to replace the damage incurred in the event of bankruptcy (or default) 
of his debtor (that is, the issuer of the bond). In return for the insurance the seller of 
the CDS gets the premium expressed as a percentage of the insured bond’s value. 
The debtor in the basic relationship (“reference unit”) is the issuer of the bond. He is, 
however, not included in the CDS contract under which his creditor (the buyer of this 
bonds) bought the CDS from the economic entity (usually a fi nancial institution) that 
is going to insure this credit. In case of default in the basic contract (the issuer of the 
bonds does not fulfi ll its obligation on time2), the seller of the CDS pays to the CDS 
buyer the contract value (par value) of basic obligation (defi ned with the bond edited 
in the basic contract).The CDS contract specifi es exactly the method of payment that 
the CDS seller provides for the CDS buyer in case of a “credit event” (the issuer of 
the bond does not pay his matured obligation established by the bond). In doing so, 
the CDS seller may pay the CDS buyer the entire nominal value of the bonds (a so-
called “physical settlement”) or the difference between the face value and the market 
value of the defaulted bonds (a “cash settlement“). The value of the bonds usually 
does not fall to zero. Some of this value remains even after the bankruptcy of the 
bond’s seller, and it is also quite possible that the bond’s issuer completely fulfi lls his 
obligation after a certain delay (Duffi e, 1999). In the case of a “credit event” occur-
ring at a large “reference unit” (its obligations under the bond issue does not settle a 
larger bank or other similar institution), there are usually many CDS sellers and CDS 
buyers (the CDS market enables the CDS sellers to distribute the risk taken by the 
CDS) and debt settlement from this relationship is carried out on a special auction, 
named “credit-fi xing event”. Sometimes there are more CDS sellers that fulfi ll the 
CDS contract with just one CDS buyer. Such a contract is made on auction and is 
called “Loan Only Credit Default Swap” (LCDS).The difference between CDS and 
a real insurance relationship is in fact that the CDS is a fi nancial market instrument 
that can be traded (Stulz, 2010). On the other side, a CDS is not a security. Economic 
entities that are buying and selling CDS often have nothing to do with the basic re-
lationship (issue of bonds); they have just certain expectations. These may be rather 
strange expectations because the CDS buyer, who is not at the same time the creditor 
from the relationship established with the given bond, can have an economic interest 
in the bankruptcy of this bond’s issuer (“reference unit”). In this case, his payment 
of the premium or the price of the CDS has an economic sense. This is similar to the 
position of someone who pays the insurance for a possible fi re at a neighbor’s house 
and gets paid for the amount of damage if the neighbor’s house, in fact, burns. The 
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relationship established with the CDS contract is such that the buyer of the CDS is, in 
the case of a harmful event (default from the relationship established with the bond), 
repaid, without receiving any damage. A CDS in which the buyer of the CDS is not 
at the same time the buyer of bonds is called “the naked CDS”.  Their advantage is 
that they increase the scope of the market and its liquidity and, indirectly, the ability 
of CDS sellers to fi nance activity in this area. For the bond buyers and CDS buyers, 
CDS are important because they reduce risk and for banks they also reduce the cap-
ital needed to insure these risks. Thus, by purchasing the CDS, commercial banks 
improve capital adequacy. 
Buyers of CDS yet hold risk (Stulz, 2010). The fi rst risk is that there will be no 
default of bonds (the risk when a CDS buyer is not at the same time also a bond 
buyer; it is the creditor from the basic relationship). The second risk is in the possi-
bility that the CDS seller will not be able to pay the amount that was protected with 
the purchase of the CDS. Sometimes the CDS seller guarantees his obligations with 
his property, but it can happen that in the case of a “credit event” this property is 
not in liquid form. It is, therefore, also a liquidity risk. The CDS market was at fi rst 
completely deregulated, but gradually regulation to this fi eld increased. Regulators 
fi rst claimed improvement in information on this market and then (2009) also on the 
mandatory use of clearing houses as well as the international standardization of the 
contracts. In 2012, the EU forbade “naked CDS” connected with the national bonds’ 
insurance (Murdock, 2013).
The premium wanted by the CDS seller depends on his assessment of the risk 
taken by selling CDS. It is interesting to note the relationship between the bond’s 
yield and the CDS premium on the same bond. The relationship between the price of 
CDS (the premium) and spread of the bond’s yield that this CDS insures is called the 
“basis”. It can be positive (CDS price > bond’s yield) or negative (CDS price < bond’s 
yield). A positive “basis” shows that economic subjects prefer liquidity, and that they 
want to, even for a high price, avoid risk (Fontana A., Scheicher M., 2010). Of note is 
also the difference in the changing bond’s yield and CDS prices. 
Investors on the CDS market are in principle more informed than the bond buyers, 
so we can expect that CDS prices should infl uence the bond’s yield, and that a bond’s 
yield changes should lag behind the changes of CDS prices (Li, Huang, 2011). For the 
same phenomenon, there can also be a different explanation: a speculative attack on 
the given issuer usually begins on the CDS market and proceeds to the bond market. 
But there is not, of course, any change in the prices of the CDS and the required 
bond’s yield that are tied to the speculative attacks, which have the ultimate interests 
of the speculators that the debtor goes out of business or declares insolvency (Fontana 
A., Scheicher M., 2010). The fi nancial crisis after September 2008 has shown that the 
introduction of CDS on the fi nancial market caused its greater vulnerability. Finan-
cial institutions became more interconnected and, consequently, the systemic risk 
enlarged. After the introduction of CDS, a fi nancial institution’s solvency became 
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more uncertain (Stulz, 2010). In this crisis some CDS sellers have not been able to 
settle their commitments, and some CDS buyers took on too much risk. This was the 
reason for straightening CDS market regulation. 
A connection between CDS, bond yields and macroeconomic fundamentals 
The data about prices of CDS connected to state bonds are hardly accessible. We 
have obtained them for Great Britain, Russia, Germany and Slovenia for the period 
from January 2009 to December 2012 (after the onset of the current fi nancial crisis). 
The CDS prices are expressed in points. 100 points means one percentage point of 
the basic value, i.e. the value of the insured bond. Our sample has one large (Germa-
ny) and one small (Slovenia) economy that are both members of the Eurozone; then 
there is one large economy, an EU Member State not on the Euro which is a part of 
the Anglo-Saxon economic space (United Kingdom); and fi nally, there is one large 
economy from Eurasia (Russia).  The main characteristics about CDS prices and 
government bonds’ yields for the mentioned countries are presented in Table 1. The 
Granger causality test’s results are presented in Table 2 (comparing the dynamics in 
the government bond’s yield and the dynamics of CDS prices) and Table 4 (compar-
ing the dynamics of different macroeconomic variables in the country of the bond’s 
issuer and the dynamics of CDS prices).  Table 3 presents the scheme of macroeco-
nomic variables that should be taken into account by government bond buyers and 
also by the CDS sellers that insure these bonds when they settle the government 
bond’s yields and CDS prices. Due to limited data, the results in this section can only 
indicate if changes in CDS prices lag behind changes of government bond’s yields 
and vice versa, as well as if the changes in CDS prices lag behind the changes of 
different variables showing macroeconomic fundamentals in the given country. 
We can see in Table 1 that in all four countries the CDS prices (for comparison 
they must be divided by 100) are smaller than the bonds’ yields. We can also see two 
different regimes in the dynamics of CDS prices during the fi nancial crisis. In Britain 
and in Russia the CDS prices reached a peak in February 2009 (at the time of the 
deepest recessions associated with fi nancial crises after September 2008) and then 
quickly declined. The CDS prices were cut in half in the UK and had decreased by 
more than two-thirds in Russia. In December 2012, UK prices were the lowest among 
all four observed national economies– only 60 points. In Slovenia and Germany the 
prices of CDS increased during the analyzed period. In Germany they reached the 
highest level in June 2012, and in Slovenia they were the highest in August 2012. Sell-
ers of CDS were apparently aware of the systemic nature of the fi nancial crisis in the 
euro area. The data in Table 1 also indicates that the speculative attack on Slovenian 
bond prices (the consequence of this attack was the huge increase in the difference 
between Slovenian and German bonds’ yields) did not take place via the CDS market. 
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In December 2012 the spread between Slovenian and German bonds’ yields was 4 
percentage points (400 basis points), while the CDS prices connected to Slovenian 
government bonds was just 281 basis points (for comparison with the bond’s yield, 
this is 2.81 percentage points). The negative base (larger spread in the bond’s yield 
than the CDS price) shows that the players in the market regarded their investment in 
Slovenian bonds as safe (Fontana, Scheicher, 2010). 
The results of the Granger causality assessment between growth rates in bonds’ 
yields and growth rates of CDS prices for the countries in our sample are presented 
in Table 2. The test is carried out on seasonally adjusted monthly data from Febru-
ary 2009 to December 2012. The percentages in the third row of Table 2 show the 
probability that the dynamics (growth or decline) in the government bonds’ yields 
did not change before the change in CDS prices. Conversely, the percentages in the 
bottom line of this table show the probability that the dynamics of CDS prices had 
not changed before the growth rates of bond yields. The higher the percentage (closer 
to 100%), the lower is the probability that bond yield growth rates changed in the 12 
months prior to the growth rates of CDS prices (third row in Table 2), whereas lower 
is the probability that the growth rates of CDS prices changed before the growth rates 
of bond’s  yields (fourth row in Table 2). The higher the percentage, the weaker is 
Granger causality.  The results in Table 2 show the expected large differences in mu-
tual dynamics of bond yields and CDS prices in the analyzed countries. In the case 
of the UK there is no connection in this relationship. The dynamics of the CDS prices 
and the government bond’s yield are not ahead of each other. In Russia, interest-
ing and contrary to expectations (Li, Huang, 2011), the dynamics of the government 
bond’s yield precedes the dynamics of CDS prices. This suggests that the insurance 
relationships for bonds are formed on the base of the bond’s yield changes. It means 
that sellers and buyers of CDS set the prices of this fi nancial instrument depend-
ing on the bond’s market circumstances. Topic was covered also by Ang, Longstaff 
(Ang, Longstaff, 2012). In Germany and Slovenia, countries that are exposed to the 
systemic risk in the euro area, there is a balanced connection between the Granger 
causality in the dynamics of the bond yields and the dynamics of the CDS prices. 
Here are obviously fl uctuations where sometimes changes in CDS prices precede 
changes in bond’s yield, and vice versa. This is an expected result of uncertainty in 
the market.  We also estimated Granger causality between the dynamics of differ-
ent macroeconomic variables that infl uence the changes in the government bond’s 
yields and the dynamics of the CDS prices. Table 3 shows a schematic overview of 
these macroeconomic variables. The economic growth in the given national econo-
my is presented by unemployment rate, the circumstances on the capital markets are 
presented by the Central Bank’s interest rate and stock market index, the economic 
stability in given national economy is presented by retail price index and general 
government debt-to-GDP, while the S&P country rating presents the confi dence in 
the economy of this country.
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The Granger causality between the dynamics of different macroeconomic vari-
ables that infl uence the changes in the government bond’s yields and the dynamics 
of the CDS prices are presented in Table 4. A high percentage (close to 100%) shows 
that the growth or decline of a given macroeconomic variable is not ahead of growth 
or decline in the CDS prices (connected with government bond). This means that 
the changes of a given macroeconomic variable do not precede CDS prices. A low 
percentage shows the opposite. Here, Granger causality indicates that a given macro-
economic variable’s changes precede the dynamics of CDS prices. 









The highest  CDS price 
and the bond’s yield in 
the same month
The month when 
the highest CDS 
price was reached
Slovenia CDS price 171 281 110 511 August 2012
Bond’s yield 4.90 5.36 0.46 6.991 -
Germany CDS price 54 74 20 134 June 2012
Bond’s yield 3.08 1.36 -1.72 1.432 -
United
Kingdom
CDS price 124 60 -64 1422 February 2009
Bond’s yield 3 .60 1.85 -1.75 3.65 -
Russia CDS price 648 190 -458 676 February 2009
Bond’s yield 12.82 6.78 -6.04 14.531 -
1 The maximum yield was reached in the same month as the highest level of the CDS prices.
2 The yield had not reached the highest level in the same month as the CDS price. They were the highest in June 2009 
in Germany and in February 2010 in the UK.
Table 2: Granger causality between changes in government bond yield and adequate 
CDS price
 Estimated for a Slovenia Germany United Kingdom Russia
12 month period Probability
The dynamics of the bond’s yield
 is not before the dynamics of the CDS prices
35% 51% 77% 1%
The dynamics of the CDS prices
 is not before the dynamics of the bond’s yield
36% 33% 94% 57%
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Table 3:  A schematic overview of variables that infl uence the level of bond yields and 
the CDS prices
Economic growth Unemployment rate
Capital market Central Bank’s interest rate
Stock market index
Macroeconomic stability Retail price index
general government debt-to-GDP
Confi dence S&P country rating
Table 4: Granger causality between the changes of different macroeconomic vari-
ables and CDS prices











Unemployment rate 9% 48% 3% 18%
Central Bank’s interest rate 5% 58% -1 96%
Stock market index 37% 97% 93% 11%
Retail price index 66% 91% 85% 14%
General government debt (% of GDP) 98% 62% 34% 67%
S & P country rating 76% 75% 14% 41%
1 The interest rate of the British Central Bank was nearly unchanged between 1/2009 and 12/2012. 
The results in Table 4 show that none of the relevant German macroeconomic 
variables have the dynamics by which we would be able to discover Granger causality 
between the CDS prices connected to the government bonds from this country. These 
prices are likely to be under the infl uence of systemic risk in the Eurozone, hence the 
increase in the CDS prices to the German government bonds from January 2009 to 
December 2012. In Slovenia, the dynamics of the CDS prices were preceded by the 
growth or decline in the unemployment rate and the changes in ECB interest rate. 
According to the results, between 30% and 40% of CDS prices for Slovenian bonds 
are less typical, but with notable exceptions of being preceded by Slovenian stock 
market index dynamics.  In the UK the changes in CDS prices on government bonds 
are markedly preceded by the dynamics of the unemployment rate, credit rating and 
government debt (as a share in GDP). In Russia, however, ahead of the dynamics of 
the CDS prices for government bonds are the changes in unemployment rate, stock 
market index and infl ation. Taken as a whole, Granger causality is notable in taking 
into account the changes in the unemployment rate and changes of CDS prices for 
government bonds in Great Britain, Russia and Slovenia.
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Conclusions
The fi rst and the approximate assessment of the connection between the dynamics of 
the government bonds’ yields and the CDS prices on these bonds (Granger causality) 
shows that in the UK none of these variables changes precede another. In Russia this 
relation was shown to be in the opposite of the theoretical expectations. The dynamics 
of the yields on Russian government bonds precedes the dynamics of their CDS prices. 
In Germany and Slovenia, however, there are the fl uctuations in a sense that changes in 
government bonds’ yields fi rst precede and later lag behind the changes in CDS prices, 
and vice versa. This is an expected result of uncertainty in the market.  A brief evalu-
ation of the CDS market for four countries and the period 2009-2012 shows that after 
the beginning of the global fi nancial crisis the CDS prices for state bonds changed in 
two different regimes. Outside the Eurozone (United Kingdom and Russia) CDS prices 
reached a peak in February 2009 (at the time of deepest recessions associated with 
fi nancial crises after September 2008) and then quickly declined. For the countries 
within the Eurozone (Germany and Slovenia) CDS prices for state bonds increased. 
Sellers of CDS were apparently aware of the systemic nature of the fi nancial crisis in 
the euro area. Granger causality tests show that there is no important macroeconomic 
variable included in the analysis that precede the CDS prices connected with German 
government bonds, while in the case of the United Kingdom, Russia and Slovenia we 
can observe the unemployment rate as the most important macroeconomic variable that 
precedes the CDS prices for government bonds.
About the methodology 
The Granger causality was estimated to see if the CDS prices’ dynamics (growth 
rates of these prices) precede or lagged behind the dynamics (growth rates) of gov-
ernment bonds’ yields in the sample of the four countries (United Kingdom, Germa-
ny, Russia and Slovenia) after the start of the world’s most recent fi nancial crisis. In 
a similar way we also estimated Granger causality between growth rates of different 
macroeconomic variables (unemployment rate, Central Bank’s interest rate...) and the 
CDS prices growth rates. Granger causality was estimated for the period from Feb-
ruary 2009 to December 2012 and for the allocation of time for one factor preceding 
the other in twelve months. Series, used in the analysis, were seasonally adjusted, and 
we passed the Unit Root Test. 
Granger causality shows no substantive connection between two economic vari-
ables, but only the fact that changes of one economic variable precedes the changes 
of other. It is the fi rst information before further econometric analysis. Granger cau-
sality (Granger, 1969) between the CDS prices’ growth rates and government bonds’ 
yields growth rates was estimated by the following equations (shown for the case of 
the United Kingdom):
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[b_uk / b_uk(-1) - 1)]  =  f {con + [b_uk(-1) / b_uk (-2) - 1)] + ... + 
+ [b_uk (-12) / b_uk (13) - 1)] + [cds_uk(-1) / cds_uk (-2) - 1)] + ... + 
+ [cds_uk (-12) / cds_uk (13) - 1)] + u}             (1)
and
[cds_uk / cds_uk(-1) - 1)] = f {con + [cds_uk(-1) / cds_uk(-2) - 1)] + ... + 
+ [cds_uk (-12) / cds_uk (13) - 1)] + [b_uk(-1) / b_uk (-2) - 1)] + ... + 
+ [b_uk (-12) / b_uk (13) - 1)] + u}            (2)
Where:
con –  constant;
b_uk –  UK government bond’s yield (in percentages), b_uk(-1) is the same variable 
in the previous month, …, b_uk(-13) is the same variable 13 months ago;
cds_uk –  CDS price (in the points) for UK government bonds insurance, cds_uk (-1) 
is the same variable in previous month, ..., cds_uk (-13) is the same variable 
in 13 months ago;
u –  the unexplained residuals of the dependent variable.
The hypothesis in the fi rst equation is that there is no Granger causality between 
CDS price growth rates and growth rates of the government bond yield for given coun-
try (it means that the dynamics of the CDS prices in the 12-month time span is not 
ahead of the dynamics of the government bond’s yield). A higher percentage in the 
result indicates that the hypothesis is confi rmed, so that we did not fi nd any preceding 
of the dynamic in CDS prices to government bond’s yield growth rates. In the second 
equation the hypothesis is that there is no Granger causality between the growth rates 
of the bond’s yield and the growth rates of CDS prices for given country while taking 
into account a 12-month span. It means that changing the dynamics of the government 
bond’s yield does not precede the CDS price dynamics. The interpretation of the results 
is similar to the case of the fi rst equation (we are testing the assumption that the govern-
ment bond’s yield dynamics is not ahead of the dynamics in the CDS prices).
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DATA SOURCES 
Our analysis was performed on the data from the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany 
and Slovenia. For these four countries and for the period from January 2009 to De-
cember 2012 we collected data from the following sources: 
- Trading Economics, New York City (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/) for 
the yield on the 10-year benchmark government bonds, unemployment rate, 
interest rates of central banks to overnight credits, consumer price index, 
stock market index, the percentage of government debt-to-GDP; 
- Sovereign Rating And Country T & C Assessment Histories (April 3, 2013), Stan-
dard & Poor’s, (http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovresearch/en/eu) for 
the credit rating of bonds edited by the governments of the analyzed countries; 
- Database Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/) for the CDS 
prices. 
The data used in our analysis are published on a daily level for each of the govern-
ment bond’s yields, the CDS prices, Central Bank interest rates, stock market index 
and credit rating. Depending on the needs of our analysis, we calculated them to the 
monthly averages. Credit ratings were converted into numerical series where the AAA 
(stable), the highest rating for a range of S & P, numbered with 67, AAA (Watching 
the negatives) is numbered with a 66, etc. Consumer price index and the data about 
unemployment rate are published on a monthly basis. All series available on daily or 
monthly basis have been seasonally adjusted. The data about government debt-to-GDP 
are published on an annual basis. These data have been distributed on a monthly level. 
NOTES
1 CDS was fi rst introduced in 1994. EBRD issued it to insure J.P. Morgan’s credit given to the petro-
leum company Exxon. This fi rst CDS was so bought by J.P. Morgan. In this way the bank reduced the 
need for capital reserves.
2 The fact that the obligation in the relationship, established with the bond, wasn’t fulfi lled is called 
a “credit event”, and it is specifi cally defi ned in the contract that establishes the CDS. This defi nition 
can mean the bankruptcy of the bond’s seller, the restructuring of the credit, common non-payment of 
the bond’s coupons, or even just a decline in the credit rating of the bond’s seller (the “reference unit”).
